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______________________________________________________________ 
Werner Brandl 
Conduct of everyday life – some views and insights 
Everyday – according to Merriam-Webster and Cambridge Dictionary a term used for rou-
tinely, ordinary, typical, usual. That sounds like banality and triviality, habit and trot – in 
short: little excitement and nothing interesting at all! It is therefore not surprising that there 
are little reason and little interest in the scientific mainstream to discuss life-world and con-
duct of everyday life – in addition to references to simple necessity and private responsibility. 
A tour d’horizon – in the sense of an informative overview of topics discussed. 
Keywords: life-world, everyday-life, conduct of everyday life, lifestyle 
______________________________________________________________ 
1  Prologue 
Everyday life is the most self-evident,  
yet the most puzzling of ideas.  
Felski, 1999, p. 15 
There are lots of manuals for a good and healthy life, popular- or pseudo-scientific 
“signposts”, which also want to show people the way through the labyrinth to a suc-
cessful life. Already in 1860, Ralph Waldo Emerson asked himself “a practical ques-
tion of the conduct of life. How shall I live? We are incompetent to solve the times” 
(Emerson, 1860, p. 1) in his collection of nine essays The conduct of life, in parts, 
thematically grouped around practical life issues and meant, for example, that “every 
man is a consumer, and ought to be a producer” (Emerson, 1860, p. 73). Nowadays 
those are available for all imaginable situations, e.g., Skills for everyday life (Over-
ton, 1990), “promotes skills such as following schedules, reading maps, finding help, 
planning a trip, and more”, Life skills. Stuff you should really know by now (Laflin, 
2018) “with the essential knowledge to tackle life’s everyday challenges”, the WHO 
(World Health Organization; https://www.who.int/behealthy) Steps for a better 
health “being more active, eating healthy, and avoiding tobacco and harmful use of 
alcohol” or – modern pictographic – with tips for a healthy life (depicted in Figure 
1). The need for it seems enormous and probably also a prerequisite being able to 
successfully master the life as a balance of contradictory demands and requirements 
as an individual task to reconcile the different, often contradictory factual, temporal 
but also meaningful and emotional needs and necessities of everyday life, and to 
integrate them into concrete action. 
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Even if everyday life is concerned with the daily normal, the ordinary, the famil-
iar, the usual, the concrete, the practical, the pragmatic, the routine in the here and 
now, in short: the self-evident, it is not surprising that – regarding the conduct of 
everyday life – it could be considered as if it were self-explanatory, so that learning it 
is not a goal of education – and thus actually not worthy of being a subject of serious 
scientific considerations!  
Relatively late and also hesitant – and initially confronted with considerable re-
sistance – some scientists turned to everyday life as quite a veritable object of scien-
tific consideration. 
The scientific study of the forms, course, possibilities, and limitations of coping 
with everyday life and lifestyle, and its actors, however, existed only slightly and led 
to a niche existence in the scientific mainstream. Thoughts about the significance of 
social structures and functions in and for everyday life were too much in the fore-
ground - and less so were the subjects involved. 
 
Figure 1: Daily routines and rituals for a healthy lifestyle (© Khoon Lay Gan) 
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With varying categories of classification, the phenomenon was increasingly accepted 
and adopted: starting from of Edmund Husserl’s “introduction to phenomenological 
philosophy” (Husserl, 1936/1970), the “phenomenology of the social world” (Schütz, 
1967), the “structures of the life-world” (Schütz, 1970; Schütz & Luckmann, 1973), 
as well Lefebvre (1968/1971) “everyday life in the modern world” and with a 
decidedly Marxist analysis, examination, and evaluation and “critique of everyday 
life” (Lefebvre, 1947/2014). Within the framework of a “subject-oriented 
sociology”, in 1995 established and Munich based project group “The conduct of 
everyday life”, (Jurczyk, Voß & Weihrich, 2016) is conceived as an active 
construction and “everyday life in social psychology” (Emiliani & Passini, 2017) 
critical-psychological consideration explicates it as “basic subject scientific concept” 
(Holzkamp, 1995/2016).  
Interest in the postmodern “lifestyle” has increased significantly. Philosophical 
ideas on “lifestyle”, “art of living” and the “attitude to life” of independence, 
meaningfulness, and sustainability stylize modern life designs.  
2  Life-world and everyday life in philosophy, sociology, 
and psychology 
Everyday life deserves to be taken seriously  
and is worthy of intensive study in its own right. 
Gardiner, M.E. (2000, p. 207) 
As far as the scientific approach to everyday life is concerned, in particular from a 
phenomenological point of view, two considerations are of central importance: 
First, it is evident that – e.g., in comparison with the natural sciences, in which 
their findings on the subject, the structures, and processes only become relevant 
through detours, e.g., vocational training and practice and the manufacture of 
products or the provision of services – the subject of scientific research and its results 
are of direct relevance to the subjects’ life-world. 
Secondly, it is not enough to simply duplicate the tasks of daily life in the scien-
tific study of them and the resulting didactic recommendations for teaching and edu-
cation, by making them a subject of discussion, but leaving them at the level of ex-
clusively routine (e.g., household) practice.  
It is, therefore, necessary to closely observe, describe, and investigate the many 
and varied aspects of everyday life (e.g., food preparation and eating culture, home 
furnishings and cleanliness, care of relatives, etc.) as phenomena which are taken for 
granted by those involved and thus regarded as less problematic (cf. Figure 2). 
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A scientific model that abstracts from the phenomenon (i.e., extracting the gen-
eral from the particular) represents and explains the phenomenon in its generality, 
understands and clarifies its possible facets in a generalizing way (cf. Figure 2). 
Nonetheless, the postulate of adequacy must continue to be observed, “that the con-
structs of the social scientist have to be consistent with the common-sense constructs 
of actors” (Eberle, 2010, p. 126) and “with the constructs of common-sense experi-
ence of social reality, i.e. they have to be understandable to an actor and must be able 
to explain an action appropriately” (Eberle, 2014, p. 14). 
Figure 2: Phenomenological grounding and understanding of scientific knowledge of life-
world 
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2.1 Phenomenology of the life-world 
An initial attempt on the life-world started in modern times with the German philos-
opher Edmund Husserl1 what he called the Lebenswelt. In 1935, when Edmund Hus-
serl, somewhat dramatically, proclaimed “the crisis of European sciences” and de-
plored in particular “the life-world as the forgotten meaning-fundament of natural 
science” (Husserl, 1970, p. 48), this was quite an affront for the established sciences, 
recalling the life-world, the given world and its constitution and two sorts of truths, 
namely “of pre- and extrascientific life-world” (Husserl, 1936/1970, p. 76) and the 
“objective-scientific world”:  
On the one side, everyday practical situational truths, relative, to be sure, but, as we 
have already emphasized, exactly what praxis, in its particular projects, seeks and 
needs; on the other side there are scientific truths, and their grounding leads back 
precisely to the situational truths, but in such a way that scientific method does not 
suffer thereby in respect to its own meaning, since it wants to use and must use pre-
cisely these truths. (Husserl, 1970, p. 132) 
In his opinion, this was a wake-up call, to put the objective sciences on their feet 
from their heads and finally to deal with the lifeworld: “The life-world is a realm of 
original self-evidences” (Husserl, 1970, p. 127) – and proclaimed for the phenome-
nological philosophy2 a return “back to the ‘things themselves’” (Husserl, 
1901/2001, p. 168): “It is of course itself a highly important task, for the scientific 
opening-up of the life-world, to bring to recognition the primal validity of these self-
evidences and indeed their higher dignity in the grounding of knowledge compared 
to that of the objective-logical self-evidences” (Husserl, 1970, p. 128). 
Thus, Husserl elevated the lifeworld to a central object of philosophy and meta 
theoretically opened up a new perspective for the social sciences, which were and are 
oriented exclusively towards structural-functionalist explanations. In his opinion, the 
originally postulated separation between the prejudiced everyday knowledge and the 
(apparently) liberated knowledge of the so-called objective sciences cannot be main-
tained, because the criterion of objectivity is ultimately based on the merely implicit 
possibility of viewing and thus ultimately possesses a life-worldly component.  
He uses the concept of the life world in an ambiguous sense: on the one hand he 
means the directly self-evident, as the anthropological foundation of the determina-
tion of man’s relationship to the world, and on the other hand, he describes the prac-
tical, descriptive and concrete life world. Husserl’s concern is not that of empirical 
science, but the reflection of the meta-theoretical preliminary questions of each theo-
rizing. 
His merit clearly lies in the “reestablishment of the ontological and epistemolog-
ical dignity of the life-world” (da Silva, 2012, p. 88) and having created the argu-
mentative basis for the fact that phenomenological concepts were thematized in his 
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succession and are even widespread in the social sciences today, in very different 
theoretical contextual references.3 
2.2 Structures of the life-world 
Therefore, the concept of the life-world (Lebenswelt) has been subsequently further 
developed in a number of post-Husserlian considerations in phenomenology and 
sociology and is inseparable and connected in different constellations with Alfred 
Schütz, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger (cf., Muzetto, 2015). 
Alfred Schütz4 adopted the term following correspondence with Husserl in the 
early 1930s in his “Phenomenology of the social world” (Schütz, 1967; original 
German title: Der sinnhafte Aufbau der Welt/The meaningful structure of the world) 
and bridged sociological and phenomenological traditions to form a social phenome-
nology. He takes up Husserl’s concept of the world in which we live and integrates it 
into the sociological analysis of the structures of the world in which we live (Schütz, 
1970; Schütz & Luckmann, 1973). For Schütz the lifeworld was “the taken-for-
granted ‘common-sense-reality’ of the social world as it is lived by ordinary individ-
uals” in “the daily course of their lives” (Harrington, 2006, p. 341). 
He conceived the meaningful structure of the social world as the core element of 
an understanding sociology with “fundamental assumptions characteristic of the 
natural attitude in the life-world, which themselves are accepted as unquestionable 
given; namely the assumptions of the constancy of the structure of the world, of the 
constancy of the validity of our experience of the world, and of the constancy of our 
ability (Vermöglichkeit) to act upon the world and within the world” (Schütz, 1970, 
p. 116).  
Together with Thomas Luckmann, Alfred Schütz devoted himself to explaining 
the everyday world: “The world of everyday life is consequently man’s fundamental 
and paramount reality” (Schütz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 3) “a basic spatial, temporal, 
and social arrangement” (Schütz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 103). Everyday life is there-
fore structured according to relevance, which results on the one hand from immedi-
ate practical purposes and on the other hand from the social situation. 
The world appears “in coherent arrangements of well-circumscribed objects hav-
ing determinate properties. For men in the natural attitude the world is never a mere 
aggregation of colored spots, incoherent noises, or centers of cold and warmth” 
(Schütz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 4) but in “a fixed succession, a Now is transformed 
into a just-past-Now and becomes a past-Now” (Schütz & Luckmann, 1972, p. 52) 
and therefore, “the stratification of the world into zones of actual, restorable and 
obtainable reach already refers to the structure of the life-world according to dimen-
sions of objective temporality and their subjective correlates, the phenomenon of 
retention and protention, recall and expectancy” (Schütz, 1970, p. 118). 
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Table 1: Stratification of the life-world in spatio-temporal respect (Compilation from Schütz 
& Luckmann, 1973, pp. 36-38; 51-52) 
Spatial arrangement  
of the everyday life-world 
Temporal arrangement  
of the everyday life-world 
 
1 within actual reach: present phase of the stream of conscious-
ness 
 
The sector of the world which is ac-
cessible to immediate experience. It 
embraces not only actually perceived 
objects but also objects that can be 
perceived through attentive advert-
ence. 
The world in actual reach has essential-
ly the temporal character of the present. 
 
 
2 within potential reach 
 
2.1 restorable reach: memory 
A sector which was previously in ac-
tual reach as constant or constantly 
changeable and to bring into actual 
reach again. 
The world in restorable reach is based 
upon the past, upon that which was 
previously in reach and upon that which 
can once be brought to actual reach. 
2.2 attainable reach: expectation 
A sector which was never in reach, 
but which can be brought within it. 
The world in attainable reach depends 
on anticipation of the future. 
Source:  
Schütz & Luckmann (1973, p. 36-38) 
 
Schütz & Luckmann (1973, p. 51-52) 
As with Husserl, in Schütz (1970) and Schütz and Luckmann (1973) everyday life 
and the lifeworld, “structuring of the spatial-temporal and social-cultural world” 
(Schütz, 1970, p. 120), still fall into one, so they are not regarded as spheres that can 
be distinguished – despite “life-world embraces still more than the everyday reality” 
(Schütz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 21) – at least conceptually. This is not surprising 
from the starting point: everyday life and lifeworld world have the same reference 
phenomenon but include different meanings. The terms can be used synonymously 
in the description of the phenomenon, but their meaning must be differentiated. 
Everyday life thus describes the world as a horizon of human action embedded in 
a social interaction system and limited in time and space. This horizon of human 
action determines both the subjective perception of the reality of individuals and the 
consensualized perception of the reality of a group. It is thus both individually con-
structed and handed down through social structures (Wieser, 2008, p. 139). 
Conduct of everyday life  
 
 61 
The lifeworld is described as a system of human interaction. The lifeworld is (...) 
not the perceived ‘everyday life’ of subjects of a social world. Rather, the lifeworld is 
a transcendental concept in the Kantian sense, which does not comprise objects, but 
the cognitive structure of objects (Wieser, 2008, p. 140). 
Berger and Luckmann “consider the standard version of functionalist explanation 
the social sciences a theoretical legerdemain” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 186) 
and so their approach towards “the social construction of reality“ (Berger & Luck-
mann, 1967) is both non-sociologistic and non-psychologistic” and “posit neither an 
ahistorical ‘social system’ nor an ahistorical ‘human nature’” but as an “insight into 
the dialectic between social reality and individual existence in history” (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967, p. 187). The dialectical relationship also applies to the formation of 
the identity of the individuals: “Identity is, of course, a key element of subjective 
reality, and like all subjective reality, stands in a dialectical relationship with society. 
Identity is formed by social processes” and “conversely, the identities produced by 
the interplay of organism, individual consciousness and social structure react upon 
the given social structure, maintaining it, modifying it, or even reshaping it” (Berger 
& Luckmann 1967, p. 173).  
In the opinion of Berger and Luckmann (1967, pp. 21-23), the phenomenological 
analysis of everyday life, of the subjective experience of everyday life, and the “in-
numerable pre- and quasi-scientific interpretations about everyday reality” (Berger & 
Luckmann 1967, p. 20) reveals an ordered reality. The reality of everyday life  
• appears already objectified, that is, constituted by an order of objects that 
have been designated as objects before my appearance on the scene; 
• is organized around the ‘here’ of my body and the ‘now’ of my present; 
• presents itself as an intersubjective world, a world that is shared with others.  
• is taken for granted as reality. It does not require additional verification over 
and beyond its simple presence. It is simply there, as self-evident and com-
pelling facticity. I know that it is real. 
2.3 Critique of everyday life 
Lefebvre’s “Critique of Everyday Life” (besides others, e.g., Agnes Heller’s ex-
ploring the relationship between the everyday, rationality and ethics, Dorothy E. 
Smith’s feminist perspective on everyday life; cf. Gardiner, 2000) – whereby cri-
tique is meant not in the common sense of complaint, blame or degradation, but in 
the Kantian sense the analysis, examination, and evaluation – just as G.W.F. Hegel 
stated in § 31 of the Phenomenology of mind “Quite generally, the familiar, just 
because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood” consists of “deciphering eve-
ryday life in its appearance, but also in its reality, by means of implementing its 
apparent, formless facts in knowledge” (Sünker, 2014, p. 328) and to bring about a 
“rehabilitation of everyday life against the devaluations made by ‘higher activities’ 
– philosophy, literature, art, morality and politics” (Sünker, 2014, p. 325).  
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Lefebvre, according to Gardiner “the quintessential critical theorist of everyday 
life”, “articulated an exceedingly valuable and multifaceted critique of everyday 
life, one that has continuing importance and relevance” (Gardiner, 2000, p. 72), 
thus presents in parallel the outlines of a Marxist-inspired sociology of everyday 
life (Lefebvre, 2014), a classic analysis of daily life under capitalism with the start-
ing point of a dialectical relationship between substructure (Unterbau) and super-
structure (Überbau) and in it (using the term Lebenswelt as an original citation) 
certainly ties in with a phenomenological tradition that in everyday life lies the 
rational core, the real centre of practice because in the last instance, knowledge and 
power, even wisdom are judged by everyday life – a statement that is not only 
compatible with Marx but also with Husserl: “How can everyday life be defined? It 
surrounds us, it besieges us, on all sides and from all directions. We are inside it 
and outside it” (Lefebvre, 2014, p. 335).  
In clearing the ground, that public life has penetrated private life, and vice ver-
sa, public and political life has become personalized and resulted in an indisputable 
reprivatization of practical and social life into a private everyday, “for Lefebvre the 
concept of everyday life constitutes the crucial vantage-point from whence to criti-
cize the formalized and alienated social practices characteristic of capitalism” 
(Gardiner, 2000, p. 77). 
Lefebvre argues that “these complex relations can be understood either from a 
historical and political perspective or from the perspective of the everyday. Here 
we have chosen the latter. This is not to say that the former is faulty or bad, merely 
that it can sometimes lead to a dead end” (Lefebvre, 2014, p. 298). 
Lefebvre (2014, pp. 271/272) sums up his program for a critique of everyday as 
follows: 
• It is the ‘human raw material’ that the study of everyday life takes as its 
proper object. It studies it both in itself and in its relation with the differenti-
ated, superior forms that it underpins. 
• Confrontation of so-called ‘modern’ life on the one hand, with the past, and 
on the other – and above all – with the possible. 
• Criticism of the trivial by the exceptional – but at the same time criticism of 
the exceptional by the trivial, of the ‘elite’ by the mass. 
• Confrontation of effective human reality with its ‘expressions’: moral doc-
trines, psychology, philosophy, religion, literature. 
However, he also makes it clear that he is interested in change: “The object of our 
study is everyday life, with the idea, or rather the project (the program), of trans-
forming it” (Lefebvre, 2014, p. 296), he is not concerned with the “question of 
describing, comparing and discovering what might be identical or analogous in 
Teheran, in Paris, in Timbuktu or in Moscow?”, but with the “question of discover-
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ing what must and can change and be transformed in people’s lives in Timbuktu, in 
Paris, in New York or in Moscow” (Lefebvre, 2014, p. 312).  
2.4 Conduct of everyday life 
According to the Munich-based project group Conduct of everyday life, starting in 
the late 1980s, it “is a sociological conceptualization of subjectivity and even indi-
viduality from a sociological point of view and as a genuine subject of sociology” 
(Jurczyk, Voß & Weihrich, 2016, p. 50). 
Conduct of everyday life takes place at the interfaces of subject-oriented sociolo-
gy and subject-scientific psychology: the sociologically oriented concept of conduct 
of everyday life describes the active construction of a system of action that structures 
and institutionalizes the subjects’ area of life in a variety of ways and focuses on the 
question of how individual and structural processes are interconnected. The subject-
scientific view, on the other hand, is devoted to the question of why for the individual 
decisions and actions in everyday life and for the emergence of everyday life as a 
personal system of action. “The basic premise of the concept is that people have to 
tackle all of the different – and in some cases contradictory – demands that they en-
counter in the various spheres of everyday life” (Jurczyk, Voß & Weihrich, 2016, p. 
34). 
 
Figure 3: Facets of the conduct of everyday life 
It is not, however, a matter of the chronological sequence, the mere addition of indi-
vidual everyday activities, but of the way in which these everyday activities can be 
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combined into a coherent, at the same time consistent and cohesive whole (cf. Fig. 
x).  
In this respect, this does not represent a trivial activity, since in a ‘concerted’ ac-
tion the everyday actions integrated into socio-cultural status and socio-economic 
resources must be combined with the individual attitudes and intentions of coping 
with everyday life, and the corresponding activities to form an ‘overall package’ that 
results in an overall concept of life conduct and are brought to the point in order to 
reconcile what one wants with what is expected or imposed on one; with what is 
necessary - measured against certain standards - and finally with what you can do 
yourself (Project group Conduct of everyday life). Three moments are decisive: the 
objective relationships in the person’s areas of reference as constraints or demands, 
but also as opportunities and resources, many socio-cultural influences in the form of 
patterns of interpretation, normative standards and cultural models, and finally dif-
ferent forms of direct social cohabitation in families, partnerships, households, etc. 
(cf. Jurczyk, Voß & Weihrich, 2016, p. 48). 
According to Voß (2001), everyday life is an individually institutionalized, com-
plex mode of action. Life conduct is no more, but also no less than a system for the 
dimensional structuring and coordination of a person’s everyday activities, in short: a 
way of acting (Voß, 2001, p. 206), which is structured by the following dimensions 
(Voß, 2001, p. 205f.): 
• Time: when, how long, in which time mode, with which beginning and which 
end, with which time position within a day, a week, a year etc.; 
• spatial: where, with which spatial logic, with which spatial orientation; 
• factual: according to which logic, with which qualifications etc.; 
• social: with whom, according to which norms, with which expectations, in 
which division of labour and cooperation logic; 
• meaningful: with which motivations, interpretations, and justifications; 
• medial: with which process forms or artefact-like aids/techniques; 
• gender-oriented: with which sex or gender logic; 
• physically: with which body mode, with which structure of the body-related 
sensuality; 
• emotional: with what emotional state, what emotional background coloura-
tion. 
In context with the obvious tendencies of the modernization of society focussing on 
rationalization, individualization, equalization of gender relations, and ‘workifica-
tion’ and the often paradoxical consequences like ambiguities and asynchronies of 
everyday life (Jurczyk, Voß & Weihrich, 2016, p. 41), the project group differenti-
ates three ideal types of life conduct: Traditional life conduct refers to traditions: 
“One lives in the same way that one has always lived because this is how it has al-
ways been” (ibid. p. 41): Strategic life conduct refers to elements of reflexivity. 
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“One’s course of action is governed by planning and control, everyday life is orga-
nized from start to finish and the individual areas of life are segmented”. Situational 
life conduct is both rational and reflexive: “Everyday actions take place in the form 
of reactive or desired adaptations to changing situations, and decisions are made 
depending on the situation encountered. This ‘muddling through’ has improvisational 
elements and allows openness and flexibility, though it can also lead to instability, 
indecision and chaos” (ibid. p. 41). However, it applies to all life-conduct types that 
“routines are shown to be decisive mechanisms to achieve continuity and to reduce 
the number of decisions that constantly have to be made. The variation lies only in 
the degree of routinization” (ibid. p. 41) 
Conduct of everyday life often develops a specific logic and a real life of its own. 
What is meant by this is that it becomes independent in the experience of those af-
fected vis-à-vis its producer, i.e., it confronts the producer objectively and even has a 
tangible retroactive effect (Voß, 2001, p. 211). The independence of conduct of eve-
ryday life and the resulting self-alienation of the person is a paradoxical condition of 
the possibility of stability, continuity, and identity (Voß, 2001, p. 212): They lead to 
safety and relief in everyday life as ultimately decisive functions of the conduct of 
everyday life. 
The theoretical concept focuses on seven basic points (Jurczyk, Voß & Weihrich 
2016, pp. 45-48): Conduct of everyday life as 
a. the interrelation of action 
Life conduct is – at least not primarily – not defined as a construction of 
meaning (as, for example, in the phenomenological concept of the lifeworld 
or of everyday life); it is instead defined primarily as a practice. 
b. the interrelation and form of everyday activities 
Life conduct is defined as the structure of the activities that are part of life on 
an everyday basis. It is about the interrelation of practical everyday life and 
its forms, rather than about the abundance of elements. 
c. the individual’s system of action 
The conduct of everyday life is a system on the level of the individual, or, 
more specifically, a system of the individual, a system of action that belongs 
to the individual, to which they are bound and which they support. 
d. the individual’s active construction and effort 
The emphasis here is instead on the fact that the system of life conduct is in-
variably actively construed, practised on an everyday level and maintained, 
as well as adapted, when necessary, to changing conditions by every person 
with reference to their individual social situation or position. 
e. a self-contained logic 
Life conduct gains both a functional and a structural autonomy in relation to 
its producer because it is based upon numerous binding arrangements with 
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social reference areas and actors, and these cannot be revoked without further 
ado. 
f. the non-deterministic sociation 
Life conduct is invariably and systematically sociated. Objective social con-
ditions in the social spheres of the individual present more or less inflexible 
constraints and demands (but also opportunities and resources) and manifold 
socio-cultural influences also have an effect on life conduct. It takes place 
not in isolation, but together with others in various forms of immediate social 
cohabitation (such as families, partnerships, and networks). 
g. a system sui generis 
Life conduct is not a social system or social entity. It is a system sui generis 
(of its own kind), which – with its own form and logic – inserts itself be-
tween the individual and society, and fulfils important functions, e.g., in-
creasing, at the same time, subjects’ relative autonomy in relation to society 
and their social integration. 
2.5 Perspective of the critical psychology 
Psychology, in general, and psychoanalysis in particular, has shown and continues to 
show little or no interest at all in researching everyday life because it does not neces-
sarily make people acting in everyday situations the object of its knowledge, but is 
primarily interested in psychic processes. Holzkamp deplores in traditional psychol-
ogy, including psychoanalysis, a “lack of clarity regarding the relationship between 
‘scientific’ and ‘everyday’ reality and the transferability of insights gained in exper-
iments and the setting to the everyday lives of the individual” (Holzkamp, 2016, 
p.77). 
Especially in the observation of the psychopathology of normal life (Freud, 1914; 
Jones, 1911), full of stories and anecdotes of faulty actions of everyday life, e.g., 
forgetting, mistakes in speech, reading, and writing, erroneously carried-out ac-
tions, errors, superstitious beliefs as psychopathological occurrences of everyday, 
Freud only detects the basis for the development of the concept of unconscious – 
seeing in the common mistakes of everyday life the same cause for “the inconsist-
encies, absurdities, and errors in the dream content” and thinks that in both phe-
nomena “the appearance of the incorrect function is explained through the peculiar 
interference of two or more correct actions” (Freud, 1914, p, 336).  
Freud concludes that, that deep down we are a lot more than we think we are on 
the surface, e.g., most trivial slips of the tongue or pen can reveal secret ambitions, 
worries, and fantasies and, therefore, the boundary between the normal and abnor-
mal human behaviour is unstable and subsequently thereof, that such symptoms are 
able to disrupt not only the communication with others but also the spheres of eat-
ing, relations, work, culture etc. 




• investigation of the errors and slips of everyday life is perhaps the best mode 
of approach to the study of psycho-analysis;  
• analysis of the occurrences in question is of great service in the treatment of 
neurotic patients; 
• considerations of the mechanism of these erroneous functionings make it 
easy to understand the way in which psycho-analysis brings about its thera-
peutic effects (Jones, 1911, p. 520). 
In contrast, Holzkamp claims, that conduct of life in traditional psychology is obvi-
ously radically underexposed, precisely “that to date the ‘conduct of life’ has evi-
dently been greatly neglected in traditional psychology” (Holzkamp, 2016, p. 67) 
and that conduct of everyday life at no point as an independent theoretical problem 
has even halfway been systematically and comprehensively analysed and conceptual-
ized to highlight “the deliberate blindness of psychology and psychanalysis about the 
existence and the scientific conceptualization of their subjects’ or patients’ conduct 
of everyday life” (Holzkamp, 2016, p. 78) and makes considerations that “a psycho-
logical conceptualization of the ‘conduct of life’ cannot be developed from the posi-
tion of traditional psychology due to its ‘blindness’, it can be addressed from the 
position of psychology as a science from the standpoint of the subject” (Holzkamp, 
2016, p. 80).  
With reference to the Munich project group, Holzkamp has located the everyday life 
as a basic concept of subject science (Holzkamp, 2016) in his “Critical Psychology” 
and started a “reinterpretation from the perspective of the science from the standpoint 
of the subject” (Holzkamp, 2016, p. 81)  
It “involves studying psychological processes as people’s experiences and ac-
tions within the social and material contexts of their everyday lives” and “expands 
psychological theory and research to explore people’s collective participations in 
everyday practice and their efforts to handle the activities, relations, conditions, con-
cerns, and struggles in life” (Kristensen & Schraube 2014, p. 291) 
The world reference of psychology, the level of mediation between social struc-
ture and everyday life is central in both approaches! But Holzkamp also makes it 
clear that subject science, as he understands it, is actually something other than sub-
ject orientation in the sense of the Munich project because the “Munich concept of 
the conduct of life centers on society, i.e., it takes the process of modernization of 
societal structures as the reference point for its analysis”, while “the psychological 
version of the science from the standpoint of the subject in some way centered on the 
individual“ (Holzkamp, 2016, p. 84). Nevertheless, he reformulates the conduct of 
life as a “mediating link between the individual and society based on the ‘relative 
autonomy’ that a subject organizing or ‘conducting’ his life has vis-à-vis society” 
(Holzkamp, 2016, p. 92). 
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Holzkamp also sees that everyday life is not conditioned by social conditions, but 
is based on possibilities of action, thus taking place relatively autonomously. This 
categorial positioning of the concept of conduct of everyday life as a level of media-
tion is also established in the “revitalization” of the “psychology and the conduct of 
everyday life” for Schraube and Højholt (2016): “The conduct of everyday life repre-
sents a mediating category between the individual subjects and societal structures” 
(p. 4) - this is the short form of what Holzkamp had explained in more detail: 
To put it more precisely: from the meaning constellations with which they are con-
fronted subjects can extract certain premises for action that they adopt as theirs and 
from which, by implication or inference, certain intentions to act then arise that are, 
for them, sensible, in the sense that they are in their interest, on which they then, in-
sofar as there are no resistances or impediments in the contingent reality that militate 
against it (i.e., all other things being equal), finally act. (Holzkamp, 2016, p. 89) 
3  Lifestyle and conduct of life - social construction and 
individual representation 
Sooner or later, everyone invents a story for himself  
that he considers his life.  
Max Frisch: Gantenbein  
[German: Mein Name sei Gantenbein]  
As Bourdieu stated in “Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste”, “life-
styles are essentially distinctive” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 130). A distinction is a strategy 
to generate and legitimize differences. “Social subjects, classified by their classifica-
tions, distinguish themselves by the distinctions they make” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 6), 
in the everyday choices in everyday life e.g., diet, clothing, taste, habitation, (eating) 
culture, etc. In fact, the economic and social conditions for different ways of living 
are bound up with systems of dispositions, Bourdieu calls “habitus”. The habitus, 
“systems of durable, transposable dispositions” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72), is not only a 
“structuring structure, which organizes practices and the perception of practices, but 
also a structured structure: the principle of division into logical classes which organ-
izes the perception of the social world is itself the product of internalization of the 
division into social classes” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 170) and concludes that “life-styles 
are thus the systematic products of habitus” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 172). 
Lifestyles, both “the distinct and distinctive life-styles” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 101) 
are understood to mean group-specific forms of everyday life and interpretation of 
individuals in the economic, social, political and cultural context of a way of life 
(Rink, 2002, p. 36). The interweaving of lifestyle and conduct of life somewhat blurs 
the different focus, which tends to be expressed in the fact that lifestyles are located 
at the meso-level and conduct of life at the micro-level of social diagnosis (Scholl & 
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Hage, 2004, p. 39). Lifestyles are seen in a mediating function between objective 
social situation and subjective world (Rink, 2002, p. 36).  
One can regard everyday life as a “missing link in the socialization process” 
(Munich Project group Conduct of everyday life): “The conduct of everyday life 
represents a mediating category between the individual subjects and societal struc-
tures” (Schraube & Hojholt, 2016, p. 4), quasi the “hinge for the relation between 
individual and society” (MaxWeber), which is determined in three ways: 
1. the affectedness and imprinting of individuals by social structures,  
2. the actions and reactions of individuals within and towards these structures 
and  
3. the resulting influence on these structures. 
The identification of lifestyles is intended to describe clear social processes of differ-
entiation by indicating socio-culturally anchored patterns of thought and action. 
These are equally identity-forming and group-forming. Constitutive elements for this 
are the opinions and interests shared in the corresponding lifestyle segment as well as 
preferred modes of action, especially in the consumption and leisure spheres. The 
concept of conduct of everyday life, on the other hand, deals in particular with the 
question of how individuals master the different challenges and constraints of every-
day life. 
 
Figure 4: Dimensions of lifestyle (Reusswig, 2002, p. 159) 
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Lifestyles can be fundamentally defined according to three dimensions (cf. Figure 4): 
• social situation: income, education, occupation, ascriptive (attributed or at-
tributive) characteristics such as age and gender. Behind this is the assump-
tion that all attempts at stylizing the self cannot be realized without recourse 
to social resources (in the double sense of possibility and limitation) 
(Reusswig, 2002, p. 159); 
• mindset: values, attitudes, goals in life and world views. This expresses the 
conviction that lifestyles are not (only) something ‘external’ or ‘objective’, 
but must essentially be regarded as an expression of ‘inner’ or ‘subjective’ at-
titudes and characteristics (Reusswig, 2002, p. 159); 
• performance: typical patterns of behaviour, everyday practices, patterns of 
consumption, furnishing. 
With reference to Bourdieu's (1984) distinction between economic and cultural capi-
tal, and with Berger and Luckmann that “the world of everyday life is structured both 
spatially and temporally” (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 26) lifestyles can be lo-
cated dimensionally: 
• A time-related dimension of lifestyle: biographical perspective and genera-
tion-specific attitude to modernity/tradition; 
• the equipment level: economic capital (income and wealth), cultural capital 
(education); 
• the individual radius of action in everyday actions: home-centered/local to 
extra-domestic/cosmopolitan. 
In his reinterpretation of the Munich project group, Holzkamp already emphasized 
the importance of distinguishing the curriculum vitae (the course of life) from the 
conduct of everyday life: “While conduct of life is, of course, in reality an aspect of 
one’s life history and thus also subject to all its changes (from birth to death), func-
tionally the ‘conduct of everyday life’ must be considered to be a separate process 
that is distinct from a person’s life history” (Holzkamp, 2016, p. 69). Characteristic 
for this is  
• the daily repetition of processes (getting up, having breakfast, reading the 
newspaper, going to work, coming home, having supper, watching TV, and 
going to bed – in a more or less standardized sequence); 
• the routinization of such a sequence, indispensable to life, so that life goes 
on: 
• the generation of a reproductive or self-reproductive system quality of its 
own, different from the developments and changes over the course of one’s 
life history; 
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• the separation of the synchrony of the activities as something distinct from 
the diachronic plan of the life history. 
 
Figure 5: Conduct of everyday life – proactive living and retrospective describing 
Conduct of everyday life is a descriptive-analytical and subject-oriented concept 
based on the creative performance, the creative will and the creative compulsion of 
individuals and thus complements the perspectives of biography and curriculum 
vitae. Conduct of life, life course/curriculum vitae, and biography (cf. Fig. 5) are 
complementary concepts: 
• Conduct of (everyday) life represents the course of everyday life in relation to 
the life course ordered by the time of life. 
• Biography as subjective construction integrates curriculum vitae and life 
guidance. 
• Life course/curriculum vitae, biography and lifestyle document at the same 
time their social construction. 
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Biography and conduct of (everyday) life refer to a new state of development of the 
subject. They embody two sides of the same thing, namely life as an individual con-
struction.  
The connection between the subjective and the objective is manifested in the indi-
vidual (re-)presentation and construction of 
• biographical life story(s) 
• current life world(s) 
• perspective life concept(s) 
• actual life practices! 
4  Epilogue 
Just about anybody can face a crisis. 
It’s that everyday living that’s rough. 
Bing Crosby in “The Country Girl”5 
The ramble through the scientific realms, which at their core or even only margin-
ally deal with everyday life and lifestyle, can neither eliminate the immanent ambi-
guity (also polyvalence) categorically nor actually: “To put it more clearly or ab-
stractly, ambiguity is a category of everyday life, and perhaps an essential 
category” (Lefebvre 2014, p. 40) 
As strange as it may seem, homo domesticus is and remains an unknown being. 
There we wash and scrub without ceasing, tidy up and move continuously from 
one corner of our house to the next - and yet we know almost nothing or only su-
perficial things about this hustle and bustle; we do not know the real principles of 
housework. (Kaufmann, 1999, p. 12) 
And yet it is necessary to get along in everyday life – and to equip children and 
young people with the necessary tools to handle “consumption, nutrition, and 
health as central fields of action for the conduct of everyday life” (Schlegel-
Matthies, 2008). Here she discusses goals, tasks, and requirements of the conduct 
of everyday life and the interrelations between developments, and structures in 
business, society, and politics on the one hand and individual conduct of life on the 
other and finds that even in the consumer society with its seemingly immeasurable 
range of goods and services, the technicization and digitalization of more and more 
fields of consumption and action, conduct of everyday life in the fields of con-
sumption, nutrition, and health always involves new tasks for which work (at 
home) has to be performed (Schlegel-Matthies, 2008, p. 13). 
Education for the conduct of everyday life is, therefore, not banal and trivial, 
but urgently needed! The task of nutrition and consumer education should be to put 
the question of the joint responsibility of all household members for the work that 
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occurs in the context of everyday life back more into the focus of educational 
measures and to make the significance of this work for society as a whole (more) 
visible (Schlegel-Matthies, 2008, p. 13). From an educational theory perspective, 
this means that life-long practical learning is on the agenda. It’s about the 
• ability to cope with diverse concrete life situations, 
• acquisition of everyday  
• skills and 
• development of competences to deal successfully with the affordances 
of the present and future.  
Some of the above-mentioned (problem) areas, especially the examination and 
discussion of the interaction of social lifestyle, private conduct of life and individu-
al lifestyles will therefore necessarily be an essential part of a study book on nutri-
tion and consumer education on consumption – nutrition – health (Schlegel-
Matthies, Bartsch, Brandl & Methfessel, in prep.). 
Notes 
The article is an updated English-language version of Brandl (2018), revised, 
amended, extended, and supplemented. 
1 Cf. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Edmund Husserl  
 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/ 
2 At the beginning of his “Logical investigations” (1900/1901) Husserl was not quite 
sure: “Phenomenology is descriptive psychology. Epistemological criticism is 
therefore in essence psychology, or at least only capable of being built on a psy-
chological basis” (Husserl, 2001, p. 167). In the second ed. (1913), however, he as-
serts: “Not psychology, but phenomenology is subject to all clarifications in pure 
logic (and in all forms of rational criticism”. 
3 The consequences of progress in the natural sciences and the effects of globaliza-
tion require further questions: “How is the life of the lifeworld to be rethought after 
the biotechnical revolutions of our present age? How is the world of the lifeworld 
to be rethought after globalization?” (Harrington, 2006, p. 341). 
4 Cf. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Alfred Schütz 
 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schutz/ 
5 The aphorism falsely stated in the phrase, “Any idiot can face a crisis – it’s this 
day-to-day living that wears you out!” is even falsely attributed to Anton Chekhov:  
 https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/06/14/face-crisis/  
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